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1 Introduction
Done well, monitoring and evaluation (M&E) has
the potential to make enormous contributions to
development practice and theory.3 Good M&E can
make projects work better, assess impact, steer
strategy, increase stakeholder ownership, build
the capacity of stakeholders to hold programme
financiers and implementers to account and
share learning more widely.4
This article argues that if these multiple
purposes of M&E were pursued it would help
align the incentives of funders, implementers,
M&E service providers, and intended
beneficiaries to increase the impacts of
agriculture on poverty. In reality, these multiple
purposes are rarely pursued, leading to the weak
provision of meaningful M&E. We make the case
that M&E in agriculture is not immune to this,
and it may even be more susceptible due to
agriculture’s unique characteristics. 
Section 2 of this article sets the scene and
explores the role of M&E within the overall aid
system, looking particularly at how the aid
effectiveness agenda and the economic and
financial crisis has promoted a greater emphasis
on aid ownership, harmonisation, mutual
accountability, results, and alignment. This new
agenda has both created and restricted the space
for innovations in M&E and we argue that the
M&E community in agriculture and beyond has
not responded adequately to it.
Section 3 analyses the state of M&E in
agriculture and finds it weak. Section 4 identifies
the drivers of the weak provision of meaningful
M&E as a failure to identify and capture the
multiple benefits of M&E, and the closed and
sensitive nature of M&E systems. 
Section 5 suggests another way forward – people-
centred M&E. People-centred M&E looks for
ways to balance multiple accountabilities,
focuses on learning within organisations and the
individual incentives for learning and finds ways
to share M&E performance information more
openly. In this way we argue that it can help to
identify and capture multiple benefits of M&E
and  reduce information asymmetries – all of
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which we argue inhibit the provision and use of
poverty reducing M&E.5 
We argue that the achievement of this approach
will allow the practice of M&E to better support
improved outcomes for poor farmers while
supporting donor reporting requirements. As
with any proposal for change the underlying
assumptions must be tested against the evidence,
which this article aims to do.
2 The changing context for M&E
Delivering good change through public policy is
challenging in any context. Headline political
arguments have to be won to set a certain
direction and smaller political battles have to be
won for effective implementation. Demonstrating
impact at scale in the real world is difficult. When
there is a political and spatial dislocation between
funders and intended beneficiaries the ability of
the latter to hold the former to account is
weakened. Poor programme performance is not
sufficiently challenged, good programme
performance not sufficiently incentivised. There is
a broken feedback loop (Barder 2009). Situate this
broken feedback loop within systems that have
weaker capacities to monitor resources and are
subject to frequent disruptions and it is inevitable
that there is a weak learning and impact culture in
aid and international development more broadly. 
These concerns were crystallised in the Paris
Declaration with a renewed call to improve the
quality of aid in terms of ownership (countries
set their own priorities), harmonisation (donors
avoid overburdening countries), mutual
accountability, results, and alignment (donors
get behind country priorities). 
In the past five years the quality agenda has got
bogged down (Wood et al. 2008), while most of
the additional attention has been on maintaining
and increasing aid flows. The global financial
crisis has put quantity at risk and has led to a
refocusing on quality. There is now a stronger
emphasis on results, transparency, accountability
to taxpayers and the citizens of aid-receiving
countries, and value for money for all. 
The field of agriculture has not yet, we argue,
responded to this call to arms in any significant
way. But now it has to, because after decades of
neglect there is a renewed focus on agricultural
development with an upturn in resources going
to agriculture.6 There is a greater interest in
initiatives that aim to make a difference to poor
farmers’ lives. However, with new interest and
resources comes an increased need to ensure
that initiatives lead to positive sustained change
on the ground. Are we seeing improvements in
agricultural productivity which are equitable and
sustainable? Is there greater social inclusion for
poor farmers? Are resources directed towards
initiatives that correspond to the priorities of
poor farmers? Are we seeing agriculture fulfil its
potential to deliver food security, nutrition and
poverty alleviation? Within the current climate
of austerity the need for agriculture and
agricultural M&E to respond is even greater.
Many within the agricultural development
community recognise the need to strengthen
their accountability to poor farmers and other
stakeholders. For instance:
z The recent Global Conference on Agricultural
Research for Development (GCARD) had
results for poor communities and wider
partnerships as key cross-cutting themes and
the lead paper for the conference noted: ‘…a
change is needed in the incentive structures in
the national and international research
community to deliver impacts for the poor…
[S]ystems need to be more accountable to
their beneficiaries’ (Lele et al. 2010: xii).
z The recent Consultative Group for
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)
Independent Review Panel suggests that
measurement and feedback loops appear to
have a major role in sustaining reform
processes in agriculture (Science Council of
the CGIAR 2007);
z Established donors such as IFAD and the
World Bank claim to be more and more
focused on people-centred approaches in their
programmes (see for instance IFAD 2002 and
World Bank 2005); 
z New donors in the agricultural development
field such as the Bill & Melinda Gates
Foundation have emphasised the need to
recognise the priorities of farmers (Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation 2009);
z There is a long tradition of farmer-focused
initiatives in agricultural research, many of
which have been piloted and documented by
the Farmer First initiative and a few members
of the CGIAR, although never wholly
embraced by the powerful players within the
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international agriculture system (Ashby 2009;
Scoones and Thompson 2009); 
z An increasing number of NGOs practise more
balanced stakeholder approaches to M&E
within agriculture and beyond (Jacobs et al.,
this IDS Bulletin).
However, to date, reality is falling short of this
rhetoric. Our own analysis of agricultural M&E
based on a survey of M&E practitioners and
agricultural experts7 (see Figure 1) indicates that
50 per cent of the respondents think that current
M&E practice does not provide good
accountability to beneficiaries. According to the
209 respondents, the strongest feature of current
M&E practice is the ability to lead to practical
improvements in projects, closely followed by the
ability to provide good accountability to donors
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Figure 1 Responses (n=209) to statement ‘Current M&E practice tends to’
Source Lindstrom (2009).
Box 1 Conclusions of recent external reviews of CGIAR centres
z CIAT [International Centre for Tropical Agriculture] has no core capacity to do impact
analysis;
z CIMMYT [Centro Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo] social science was
only working in half of the areas that CIMMYT recognised as its core tasks; and this
was before it shut down what was traditionally known as one of the most successful
economics programmes in the CGIAR system;
z According to ILRI’s [International Livestock Research Institute] 2008–10 MTP
[Medium Term Plan], a large share of its work is social science in nature and more than
20 research scientists work in this area, yet there is almost no evidence that its social
scientists are publishing in journals reviewed and recognised by their peers;
z IWMI [International Water Management Institute] greatly expanded its social science
capacity, mostly with young and inexperienced social scientists without hiring almost
any that had proven he/she could plan and direct a major social science agenda – the
output of the programme shows that this probably was a mistake;
z Recent External Programme and Management Reviews (EPMRs) of ICARDA
[International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas], IPGRI [International
Plant Genetic Resources Institute] (now Bioversity) and others have concluded that they
have few systematic programmes in economics, social research or general social science.
Source Science Council of the CGIAR (2007).
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and clarify internal strategies and policy
objectives. Current practice is also good at
generating wider lessons for the field, but it rarely
provides good accountability to beneficiaries,
rarely empowering them or building their
capacity. Accounting to donors and therefore
taxpayers seems to be a greater priority than
exhibiting accountability to beneficiaries. These
results characterise a culture of compliance rather
than one of sustainable results.
3 What is the state of M&E in agriculture?
The broad consensus in the literature is that
M&E – including agriculture – is weaker than it
should be. The shortcomings of M&E make
familiar reading. In a wide ranging review of the
state of M&E Munce (2005) collates the
standard critiques:
z A failure to specify what M&E is for and to
facilitate its use.
z Lack of stakeholder participation and
responsiveness: ‘Effective participation
requires, perhaps above all, a climate where
stakeholders, including donors, see each other
as partners with the common ultimate purpose
of achieving development results’ (p12).
z Too little attention to theories of change – too
much of a focus on inputs and outputs and not
enough on outcomes.
z A lack of systematic capacity building for
M&E: ‘Despite the term’s frequent usage and
cited importance in the literature and despite
the vast number of project M&E activities
that are annually conducted, capacity building
for M&E is frequently overlooked’ (p18).
Other major criticisms include:
z Not enough resources spent on impact
evaluations – i.e. studies that document the
extent to which changes in the wellbeing of
the target population can be attributed to the
particular programme (measuring net
changes) (CGD 2006 and Ravallion 2008). 
z Not enough focus on the trajectories for
impact – i.e. the pathways of impact,
particularly in relation to the time it takes to
achieve impact (Woolcock 2009).
z Not enough focus on the context of
interventions – i.e. ensuring evaluation not
only asks ‘what works and how’, but also
‘under what circumstances’ (Rogers 2008;
Lucas and Longhurst, this IDS Bulletin).
z Not enough focus on flexibility and learning –
adapting to changing circumstances and
learning from successes as well as failures
(Oswald and Taylor, this IDS Bulletin).
z Not enough use of M&E data and findings
(see Patton 1978 and Patton and Horton 2009
for a discussion). For instance, Bastoe argues
that there is ‘…a growing disillusionment
with conventional evaluation praxis. Many
governments experience only limited use of
evaluation findings. Evaluation findings do
not automatically feed back into a receptive
and responsive decision-making process’
(2006: 97 quoted in Lucas forthcoming). 
Reviews of M&E in agriculture tell a similar
story. A scoping paper for an external review of
social science in the CGIAR, summarised in
Box 1, identifies some initial concerns. Weak
IDS Bulletin Volume 41  Number 6  November 2010 9
Table 1 CGIAR impact assessment studies
Impact evaluations focusing on Impact evaluations focusing on All impact evaluations
income as an outcome variable (income + nutrition/health) as an 
outcome variable
2008 0 0
2007 1 2
2006 4 4
2005 0 0
2004 4 5
2003 5 6
Total 1995–2008 67 83 761
Source As of 29 August 2009 http://impact.cgiar.org/ (accessed 15 Aug 2010).
social science in CGIAR centres reflects, in part,
a lack of priority given to M&E and will, in turn,
generate weak M&E. 
The CGIAR’s own Standing Panel on Impact
Assessment (SPIA) lists impact evaluations done
throughout the CGIAR. Table 1 shows that out
of the 761 listed by the CGIAR as having been
published in the past 14 years, only 83 listed
impact focusing on welfare indicators such as
income or nutrition/health status and only 67
listed income. As the table shows, in the past
four years only five impact studies of agricultural
research on income have been published. 
Neither the Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) nor the
International Initiative on Impact Evaluation (3ie)
have undertaken or commissioned many
agricultural project impact studies. As of mid 2009
the project database search at the Poverty Action
Lab website shows 25 health evaluations, 38 in
education, only five in agriculture (and these are
all in Kenya).8 And only two of 18 funded
applications in round one of 3ie funding were
awarded to agriculture projects (irrigation, low-
cost farm equipment) compared to six in health.
Presumably this reflected some combination of low
submissions and lack of quality of submissions.9
Finally, from the stakeholder survey reported on
in Figure 1, Figure 2 reports that a majority of
respondents (56 per cent) stated that in their
opinions M&E in agriculture was weak or very
weak.10
Taken together, this evidence suggests that M&E is
weak and that M&E in agriculture is no exception. 
4 Why is M&E in agriculture so weak? 
Generally, we argue that the major drivers of
weak M&E in agriculture are common to many
sectors and are:
a a failure of the stakeholders to appreciate the
multiple benefits of M&E;
b a failure of the investors to capture the
multiple benefits of M&E as a result of:
z the public goods aspects of M&E 
z a misalignment of implementer incentives
to collect and use M&E data;
c the sensitive nature of M&E data which
creates information asymmetries between
M&E providers and users and results in
underprovision of M&E. 
We make the case that (a) these drivers can be
addressed through a focus on the multiple
purposes of M&E so that the multiple benefits are
identified and captured and information
asymmetries are diminished, and (b) the different
stakeholders involved in M&E investment,
provision and use will likely have different
knowledge of and preferences about these five
purposes and so a focus on multiple purposes is
best achieved by seeking the perspectives of
several stakeholders. Figure 3 identifies five
different purposes of M&E11 (as distinct from
types of M&E) with opportunities for learning for
all the stakeholders involved in M&E.
4.1 Driver 1 A failure to appreciate the multiple
benefits of M&E
M&E can generate benefits in each of these five
areas. If the benefits are understood and
realised, then they will spur additional
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Figure 2 Responses (n=198) about overall strength of M&E in agricultural development
Source Lindstrom (2009).
commitment, not just in terms of additional
investments in time and resources, but in terms
of general prioritisation of M&E. Since there are
often limited resources available for M&E, the
preferences of the more powerful actors will tend
to dominate the way in which M&E is provided
(see Oswald and Taylor, this IDS Bulletin). As we
have seen in Figure 1 majorities of the surveyed
stakeholders think that M&E currently
generates project improvements, provides good
accountability to donors and leads to clarification
of internal strategies and policy objectives. These
three functions are clearly of interest to those
who invest in M&E. If more stakeholders were
involved in project design and evaluation, would
a more rounded picture of benefits develop? We
argue that this would be the case, thereby
attracting additional commitment towards M&E. 
4.2 Driver 2 A failure to capture the multiple benefits
of M&E 
We argue that there are two types of ‘failure to
capture’:
z Investors may have an appreciation of the full
range of benefits generated by M&E, but are
simply unable to capture them because they
are open to others for use and investors do not
stand directly to benefit. This is a particular
risk for private investment in M&E. 
z There is a failure to capture benefits due to a
lack of organisational incentives (e.g.
incentives that disconnect those who initiated
a programme from the results when they
emerge).
On the first type of ‘failure to capture’ Ravallion
(2008) argues that underinvestment in M&E (or
what he calls evaluative research) happens when
project practitioners and funders do not stand to
capture all the benefits of their investments.
Drawing on numerous examples he argues that
this public goods aspect of M&E will result in a
particularly large underinvestment in M&E in
(a) projects that will not yield short-term
results,12 (b) projects that have more diffuse
impacts, and (c) projects that help us understand
the relevance of results for other contexts
(external validation).13
The ‘underinvestment due to the public goods
nature of M&E’ reasoning is used in the Center
for Global Development’s report When Will We
Ever Learn? (CGD 2006). This article, one of the
outputs leading to the formation of 3ie, identifies
an ‘evaluation gap’ which, it asserts, is costly.14
The report classifies M&E into four categories:
(a) monitoring (are projects being implemented
according to plan), (b) process and institution
evaluations (how and why are things going to
plan, or not), (c) performance assessments (that
demonstrate accountability to stakeholders ‘by
providing information about their activities and
opening their books’), and (d) impact
assessments. It argues that the evaluation gap is
especially serious in the latter category, impact
assessments. They make the case that this is
because of two factors: firstly, the public goods
aspect (e.g. on methods and results) leads to
underinvestment and, secondly, the additional
data that need to be collected (e.g. comparator
data) are very resource intensive. 
Whereas the Centre for Governance and
Development (CDG) identify only the global
public goods aspects of impacts assessments, there
are significant public goods aspects in other forms
of M&E. On monitoring, there are methods that
need to be shared to identify the purpose of the
monitoring. For example, Ravallion (2000) maps
spending (i.e. monitoring data) by poverty rates to
get some real time data on the targeting
performance of programmes. There are also
methods that need to be shared to allow different
stakeholders to monitor different groups, for
example methods for allowing farmers to monitor
agricultural development projects. On process
evaluations, there is value in sharing methods for
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Figure 3 The five purposes of M&E
assessing capacities ex ante (can the organisation,
its implementing staff and the institutional
context within which they reside sustain the
project?) and ex post (did the project leave the
organisation stronger or weaker?). The significant
public goods aspects and additional data needs in
the other three M&E categories suggest these
areas are also significantly underinvested in. 
The second type of ‘failure to capture’ relates to
organisational incentives. Oswald and Taylor in
this IDS Bulletin identify four types of mis-
aligned incentives:15
z The incentive to demonstrate impact, the disincentive
to learn why: The current trend to demonstrate
impact means that there is often an incentive
for organisations to focus on what is easy to
measure within an M&E process and less
attention is given to learning how and why an
intervention has been successful or not. This
argument can be linked to the debate on M&E
methods (see Lucas and Longhurst, this IDS
Bulletin). 
z The incentive for upward accountability, the
disincentive to learn from below: Many
development organisations are unbalanced to
deliver on upward accountability. This can
create incentives to value the knowledge and
learning that donors demand, rather than the
knowledge and learning that other
stakeholders (including the organisation
itself) value or require.16
z The incentive to ‘do’, the disincentive to ‘learn’: In
many development organisations a particular
member of staff or department is responsible
for M&E, and others are responsible for
implementation, with limited interaction and
mutual learning. The incentive is for some
staff to ‘do’ and different staff to ‘learn’. 
z The incentive to conform, the disincentive to take
risks: Learning involves changes in behaviour
and actions and inherently involves shifting
power relationships. This can create
disincentives for organisations to learn, as the
learning outcomes can be challenging to those
in positions of authority. 
4.3 Driver 3 The closed and sensitive nature of the
M&E system 
This is the hypothesised driver for which we have
least evidence. Nevertheless it is clear that M&E
is a sensitive business. It is embarrassing to
finance a programme that has little impact. It is
hardly career advancing if your monitoring system
shows milestones being missed. This means M&E
reports have less chance of being made public.
This also diminishes the incentives of managers to
respond to M&E data. This leads to a more closed
system with two types of information asymmetry
between users and suppliers of M&E:
z Organisational reputation: 
z Do M&E users have a good track record of
using M&E? 
z Do M&E suppliers provide value for money?
z Quality of the services currently being
provided and used:
z Are M&E services responsive to the needs
of users?
z Are M&E services being used?
Unlike for most research, donors and other users
of M&E have no third party peer review process
to validate the quality of most M&E. The
providers do not know enough about donors’ past
and potential use of M&E services. This is
compounded by the different preferences and
needs these groups have for M&E. Information
asymmetries will diminish effective M&E supply
in the medium run as users are discouraged by
reception of M&E they did not anticipate and in
turn providers are discouraged by the non-use of
their work. 
Because of these three hypothesised drivers –
failure to appreciate benefits, failure to capture
benefits and information gaps between M&E
users and providers – we argue that M&E in
general suffers from a lack of investment,
provision and use and cannot enable the needed
alignment of incentives of funders,
implementers, service providers, and intended
beneficiaries to increase the impacts on poverty.
4.4 Is there anything particularly special about
agriculture?
Although M&E is weak in general, we suggest
that there are certain features of agriculture that
make it even more difficult to achieve good M&E: 
z Lack of consensus on the overall goal of agriculture:
Impacts for farm households can be both
direct (e.g. higher farm income) and indirect
(e.g. higher wages need to be paid for in-
demand farm workers). Similarly for the wider
rural/urban space, impacts can be both direct
(e.g. lower food prices) and indirect (e.g.
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improved food security and thus political
stability). This makes it more difficult to
agree on the purpose of M&E (see Meinzen-
Dick et al. 2003).
z Long, uncertain and complex17 causal chains:
Agricultural development interventions tend
to have longer, diffuse and less certain links
between interventions and human welfare
outcomes. Agricultural development
interventions are often classified as complex.18
This is particularly the case for agricultural
research (Millstone et al., this IDS Bulletin)
and agricultural policy initiatives (Sumner et
al., this IDS Bulletin). This allows more
opportunity for information asymmetries to
arise making M&E more difficult in a
technical sense.19
z High level of risk: Agricultural development
interventions are sensitive to the uncertainties
imposed by climate and other phenomena
(Chambers 1997), accentuating the potential
disconnect between individual incentives and
programme impacts (see Sabates-Wheeler et
al. for an overall discussion of farm-level risk
and Devereux and Longhurst for a discussion
on seasonality in this IDS Bulletin).
z Lack of opportunity for beneficiaries of agricultural
service delivery (e.g. farmers) to organise around a
facility: Recipients of health services or
education services (whether medical staff or
patients, teachers or students) are less
dispersed than in agriculture. There is more
routine contact between provider and user,
and among users. Farmers and farmer
services are more spatially dispersed than
their counterparts in health and education.
They can less easily share innovations and less
easily exert collective pressure on other actors
in the system (see FANRPAN 2005).
Collecting their views is more expensive.
Where farmer organisations exist, these face
difficulties due to their political nature and
lack of long-term support.
z Agriculture is wrapped up in a wider range of
cultural and institutional aspects. It is a way of
life, an individual identity, a collective political
identity, a source of food, of income, and a
means of managing the environment (Cernea
and Kassam 2005). Although potentially not
more so than in any other sector, gender
inequalities are very prevalent in agriculture
(Kabeer, this IDS Bulletin). 
5 What can be done to strengthen M&E in
agriculture?
If M&E in agriculture is weak, what can be done
to identify M&E’s wider benefits, to capture the
benefits and close information gaps about M&E
users and providers? 
We hypothesise that a ‘people-centred’ perspective
on M&E can help change the dynamic by:
z finding ways to balance multiple
accountabilities; 
z focusing on learning within organisations and
the individual incentives for learning; 
z finding ways to share M&E performance
information more openly. 
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Table 2 People-centred M&E
The drivers of weak M&E and examples of how people-centred M&E can counter them
Component of people- Identifying benefits Capturing benefits Closing information gaps about 
centred M&E M&E users and providers
1 Balancing multiple Greater scoping capacity Enable different groups to Via feedback loops from 
accountabilities to identify benefits and capture benefits by building intended beneficiaries
unintended consequences their capacity to do so
of interventions
2 Enhancing Greater capacity to learn Greater organisational As organisations get better at 
organisational learning from other organisations capacity to capture benefits responding to M&E they 
become more open
3 Building wider learning Greater capacity to identify Greater ability to capture Generate learning about 
benefits from M&E work more indirect benefits reputations and performance 
elsewhere of M&E users and providers
The focus is on inclusion, organisation and
incentives, rather than an emphasis only on tools
and methods. Our arguments are summarised in
Table 2. 
What does the evidence say about these three
hypotheses?
5.1 Balancing multiple accountabilities
As we argue above, in order to reap the full
benefits of M&E, there is a need to balance
multiple accountabilities and align the
preferences of all stakeholders. In practice this
means greater involvement of beneficiaries in
M&E activities, along with all other
stakeholders. We argue that greater involvement
of beneficiaries in M&E activities is a key
leverage point to strengthen M&E provision, in
addition to being the ‘right’ thing to do.20
What does the evidence have to say about the
value of balancing multiple accountabilities? In
the absence of directly relevant literatures, we
focus on papers that ask (a) does participation in
project design (upstream M&E) enhance
outcomes? and (b) do social accountability
mechanisms (downstream M&E) improve
outcomes?
In terms of the feedback loop in Figure 4, we are
interested in the evidence of whether the arrows
going from right to left improve outcomes.
5.1.1 Does participation improve project outcomes? 
Mansuri and Rao (2004) provide a review of
community-driven projects in terms of the
impacts of participation on targeting, service
delivery and sustainability. The review finds that
targeting of the poor is improved by the
participation of intended beneficiaries, but
tending to this only when preferences are
egalitarian, decision-making is open and
transparent, and the rules for classifying
households as poor are clear. The authors
conclude ‘some studies have shown an
association between the level of some index of
participation and project effectiveness, but the
direction of causality is unclear.’ Nevertheless a
number of multi-project studies that pay
attention to causality in fact find that
participation improves delivery of water projects
in Indonesia (Isham et al. 1994),21 public works in
South Africa (Hoddinott et al. 2001) and the
maintenance of rural support programmes in
Northern Pakistan (Khwaja 2001).22 Many more
studies are cited which pay less attention to
causality and there the results are mixed.23
Another review paper by Platteau (2007: 38)24
summarises the difficulty with these studies:
‘measurement of the impact of participation on
development project outcomes is
methodologically complex, and, at this stage,
there are still few conclusive statements that can
be made about the importance and the modus
operandi of this impact’. 
The Platteau paper restricts itself to quantitative
outcomes in a cause and effect framework.
Taking a more qualitative systematic approach a
recent paper by Gaventa and Barrett (2010)
reviews a non-random sample of 100 case studies
of citizen engagement in 20 countries conducted
over a ten-year period by one research
programme consortium. It finds that citizen
participation produced positive effects across
developmental and democratic outcomes in 75
per cent of the outcomes.25 The study highlights
the importance of looking at intermediate
outcomes; it is difficult to draw a straight line
between participation and development outcomes
without looking at the process of engagement
which might facilitate empowerment outcomes
and contribute to development outcomes. 
We conclude that there is plenty of evidence that
participation can make a positive difference to
development outcomes, but that it certainly does
not have to. The impacts depend on a wide range
of context factors, often relating to norms
around hierarchy and power. 
5.1.2 Do social accountability mechanisms improve
outcomes? 
Many mechanisms for making government and
private sector actors more accountable to
citizens have been trialled over the last decade.
These include citizen report cards (CRCs),
budget tracking, community scorecards, citizen
juries, project monitors, community expenditure
tracking and social audits of commitments and
realities on the ground (Arroyo and Sirker 2005).
The studies of their impacts are not
methodologically strong, at least in terms of
accounting for causality. 
Paul (1998) was one of the first to grapple with the
measurement of the impact of the citizen report
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card on changes in the quality and responsiveness
of service providers. In the context of evaluating
the response of Bangalore’s public services to
report card implementation, he concludes: 
there is some evidence that public awareness
of these problems has increased as a result of
the experiment. Civil society institutions
seem to be more active on this front and their
interactions with public agencies have become
better organised, purposive and continuous.
As a result, some public agencies in Bangalore
have begun to take steps to improve their
services. The paper concludes that public
feedback (‘voice’) in the form of a report card
has the potential to challenge governments
and their agencies to become more efficient
and responsive to customers (Paul 1998: 2). 
Ravindra (2004) also undertakes a review of the
Bangalore public service experience with the
report card for the World Bank’s Operations
Evaluation Department. The paper concludes: 
on the whole, the impact of the CRCs has
been positive. They helped to increase public
awareness of the quality of services and
stimulated citizen groups to demand better
services. They influenced key officials in
understanding the perceptions of ordinary
citizens and the role of civil society in city
governance. Bangalore has witnessed a
number of improvements following the CRCs,
particularly the second one. The state
government and public agencies launched a
number of reforms to improve the
infrastructure and services in the city,
including via property tax reform through a
self-assessment scheme, the creation of the
Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF), and
streamlining of agencies’ internal systems and
procedures. There is now greater
transparency in the operations of government
agencies and better responsiveness to citizens’
needs. While a number of other factors have
also contributed to the transformation of
Bangalore, the CRCs acted as a catalyst in the
process (Ravindra 2004: iii).
Conducting further research on the report card
experience in Bangalore and Jaipur, Deichmann
and Lall (2003) question the very theory of
change of citizen scorecards of service provision.
Do perceptions of quality received bear any
resemblance to actual quality received? They
find that scores are indeed influenced by the
quality of services provided, but scores are also
influenced by a number of household
characteristics, including the quality of services
provision received by peers. 
Brixi (2009: 2) assesses that the impact of the
use of a citizen scorecard survey helps Chinese
citizens influence urban service provision design
and implementation, helping policymakers to
‘reveal weaknesses and monitor progress in
public service delivery’. 
McNamara (2006) reviews US and developing
country evidence on the impacts of health
provider report cards on accountability to
citizens and in the quality of healthcare
provision. She points out that the idea of
provider-specific reports is not new: 
I am fain to sum up with an urgent appeal for
adopting this or some uniform system of
publishing the statistical records of hospitals. If
they could be obtained … they would show
subscribers how their money was being spent,
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Figure 4 The feedback loops between donors, implementers and intended beneficiaries
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what amount of good was really being done with
it, or whether the money was doing mischief
rather than good’ (Florence Nightingale 1863). 
The paper concludes that ‘there is evidence that
provider-specific comparative reporting, and in
particular public reporting, enhances provider
accountability and prompts improvements in
quality of care’ (McNamara 2006: 106). 
One of the most rigorous studies in the classical
sense is a randomised field trial of community-
based monitoring of public primary healthcare
providers in Uganda. It finds evidence that the
implementation of ‘citizen report cards’ reduced
child mortality by 33 per cent, as well as
generating other health benefits. A year after
the intervention, treatment communities were
more involved in monitoring the provider and
health workers appeared to exercise greater
effort in serving the community. The study
documents large increases in utilisation and
improved health outcomes. Within the
experiment, the cost per child death averted was
$300, well below the average of $887 for 23 other
interventions (Björkman and Svensson 2009).
This study seems to support our analysis that
beneficiary feedback can drive up performance
by ensuring that implementers become more
responsive to the needs of beneficiaries.
Another rigorous evaluation shows little
improvement in public sector behaviour from
bottom-up feedback mechanisms. Olken (2007)
undertakes a randomised field experiment on
reducing corruption in over 600 Indonesian
village road projects. The paper finds that:
increasing government audits from 4 per cent of
projects to 100 per cent reduced missing
expenditures, as measured by discrepancies
between official project costs and an independent
engineers’ estimate of costs, by eight percentage
points. By contrast, increasing grassroots
participation in monitoring had little average
impact, reducing missing expenditures only in
situations with limited free-rider problems and
limited elite capture (Olken 2007: 200). 
A randomised control trial by Banerjee et al.
(2008) in India, on community mechanisms to
hold primary schools accountable found that
giving villagers information about the state of
their schools was not enough – it required
encouragement and training, in small groups, to
turn this information into an intervention that
improved learning outcomes. They conclude that
‘it seems clear that the current faith in
participation as a panacea for the problems of
service delivery is unwarranted’ (2008: 25).
In Kenya, in another randomised control trial,
Duflo et al. (2008) find that hiring supplementary
contract teachers may be an effective way of
meeting the demand for teachers in Kenya
thereby reducing absenteeism and promoting
learning. They find that ‘the biggest gains come
when local school committees are empowered to
effectively monitor these teachers and when extra
classes are structured so as to target instruction to
students’ initial achievement level’.26
These studies are far from conclusive: some show
a positive impact of feedback mechanisms on
development outcomes, some show no impact,
and some are not set up to conclusively
demonstrate impact, just plausibility. The
studies that examine the ‘how’ questions confirm
that implementation methods, norms of fairness
and expectations matter. 
5.2 Enhancing organisational learning 
The beginning of Section 4 argued that
enhancing organisational learning can help
strengthen M&E. Learning organisations would,
by definition, have a greater capacity to (a) learn
from other organisations and therefore identify
multiple benefits, (b) have a greater organisational
capacity to capture these multiple benefits, and
(c) become more open to others to learn from
thereby contributing to the reduction of
information gaps between M&E users and
providers. 
But how are learning organisations built and
incentivised? There is a large set of literatures on
how organisational incentives and wider
institutional incentives affect learning. There
are two major strands: on organisational learning
(Huber 1991; Easterby-Smith 1997) and on
learning organisations (Senge 1990; Roper and
Pettit 2003). Oswald and Taylor (this IDS
Bulletin) review much of this literature. 
There is a great deal of overlap between the two
approaches.27 Characterising both at their
extremes, we can describe organisational
learning as understanding how organisations
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learn about themselves and how they make
decisions. Here learning is very much a means to
an end – better performance defined as improved
project outcomes. At the other extreme, we have
learning as an end in and of itself as well as being
a means to an end. The focus is more openly
normative about the values it espouses (diversity,
non-hierarchy, boundary-spanning, critically self-
reflective) and, importantly, attempts to link the
organisation strongly into a wider social system
(Easterby-Smith et al. 1999).
Again at their extremes, the two approaches can
be characterised as in Figure 5: organisational
learning focuses more on single-loop learning
from results to shaping goals, values and
strategies. The learning organisation approach
focuses more on the double-loop learning
whereby underlying assumptions are challenged
(Argyris and Schon 1978). These distinctions are
fluid. As Roper and Pettit (2003) note the
learning organisation approaches can be very
pragmatic, emphasising knowledge creation
linked to organisational goals linked to action.
Similarly many organisational learning
approaches are designed to examine the
underlying assumptions and risks about their
projects, organisation and context. 
Oswald and Taylor in this IDS Bulletin argue that
some of the organisational disincentives that
drive a lack of learning from M&E could be
changed with self-reporting systems and
participatory forms of M&E. Linking such
systems to incentive structures within
organisations could be a key starting point
(Pasteur and Scott-Villiers 2006). 
Can beneficiary feedback support the
realignment of incentives within organisations
and promote single-loop or even double-loop
learning? Brett contends that ‘because agencies
are often providing services (for example, the
empowerment of rural women) whose output
cannot be priced and whose impact is very
difficult to observe … these agencies will
perform effectively only where workers are
genuinely committed and where managers know
that citizens or donors are able to monitor what
they are doing, and able to withdraw support
should they fail’ (2000: 18). A shift towards such
participatory feedback approaches linked to
appropriate incentive structures is not easy and
it is clear that organisations must understand
the potential benefits for their own learning
(Abbot and Guijt 1998). Thompson (1995),
reviewing the literature on why government
bureaucracies in the South have shifted towards
participatory approaches, shows there are four
main drivers.28 
1 Expediency: attempts to do more with less
have forced agencies to find new ways of
implementing programmes. In the current
climate of austerity it is likely that
organisations will need to continue to find
ways to be more efficient. There is some
evidence to show that feedback systems and
other forms of participation can be cost
effective in terms of identifying rapid
corrections to projects (World Bank 2009) and
making projects more relevant for
beneficiaries (Magione et al. 2005), although
in certain circumstances they may also
increase logistical and transaction costs of
monitoring (World Bank 2009; Parkinson
2009). Abbot and Guijt (1998) argue that
further study on costs is needed.
2 Pressure from the donor community: where
donors have demanded greater involvement of
beneficiaries in decision-making this has been
an important factor (Johnson 2001). However,
such demand is often accompanied by greater
focus on accountability in general, which may
have the effect of increasing pressure on
agencies to perform to donor-defined standards
(Thompson 1995). Nevertheless, donors are the
key agents of change. If they show the kind of
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Figure 5 Single and double-loop learning
Source Reproduced with kind permission from 
Ed Batista, available  http://edbatista.typepad.com/
edbatista/images/2006/12/Double-Loop_Learning_2_
Large.gif (accessed 24 August 2010).
Most Learning (Single-Loop)
Improvement within an existing
system that rests on unchallenged
assumptions that are implicit and
unchallenged
Double-Loop Learning
Expanding the analytical frame to
explicitly identify and then 
challenge underlying assumptions
leadership that sets up feedback systems for
the greater good even if this may prove
inconvenient for them at a later date then they
can begin to create real partnerships. 
3 Recognition of limits of top-down, blue-print
development: these approaches have been
seen to be ineffective in addressing the
complex realities of poor people (see Rodrik
2008). Widening the set of stakeholders
consulted reduces the likelihood of reverting
to blueprints. 
4 Stories of successful application of participatory
approaches by other organisations have been
convincing in persuading others to try. 
For those who advocate greater organisational
attention to beneficiary involvement and
feedback in M&E, there are a number of drivers
to engage with and to leverage. The main driver,
however, will be the answer to the questions:
does it work, when and how? As we have seen in
Section 4.1 the evidence base is patchy. A
systematic review, especially one drawing on rich
country experience, is badly needed.29
5.3 Building wider learning
Finally, a people-centred perspective to M&E can
enable the sharing of M&E performance
information more openly to support wider
learning about what works, how, by whom, and
under what circumstances. It does this by
creating and sharing public goods. 
Table 3 shows some of the mechanisms and their
hypothesised impacts on identifying benefits,
capturing more indirect benefits and learning,
and closing information gaps between M&E
stakeholders. 
Sharing data: As Thompson (1995) argues,
highlighting success stories is one way of
encouraging organisations to adopt new
practices. Examples include the opening up of
the World Bank’s database on development
statistics30 and new efforts to make health
research data available.31 Radelet and Siddiqi
(2007) show the value of making M&E project
data available. They use data from the first 134
evaluated programmes funded by the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria and
correlate performance grades with programme
characteristics. They find, for example, that
projects which receive initial ‘accept’ scores are
associated with better performance some years
later, suggesting – but not proving – a return to
initial investments in thinking through the
project theory of change and implementation
issues. There are many project databases
available which could be brought into the public
domain and analysed for public goods purposes
and for organisational learning. 
Conducting systematic research on M&E: There are
very few systematic reviews on M&E and even
fewer with features of ‘people-centred’ M&E.
One such systematic review was conducted by
Miller and Campbell (2006) evaluating the
claims made by proponents of ‘empowerment
evaluation’, an approach to M&E which casts the
evaluator as an agent of social change. Note that
this approach is distinct from our hypothesis
about voice, which says that a more balanced set
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Table 3 Activities to support wider learning
Sharing data about Conducting systematic Creating comparator data
innovations, programmes, public research on M&E 
users, providers and tools
Greater capacity to identify X X X
benefits from M&E work 
elsewhere
Greater ability to claim X X
benefit for more indirect 
benefits
Learning about reputations X X
and performance of M&E 
users and providers
of voices will help establish a consensus Theory
of Change and help planning for impact and
learning from the intervention, and make
grantees and funders more responsive to
beneficiary needs. Miller and Campbell evaluate
46 evaluations that call themselves
‘empowerment evaluations’. They classified
them according to approaches to empowerment
(Socratic, structured guidance and participatory)
and then they assessed the claims made by the
authors against the stated goals of empowerment
evaluation. They did not evaluate whether the
approach strengthened the impacts of the
projects in terms of outcomes such as income.
Nearly all evaluations drew on community
knowledge, but only 19 per cent of them reported
on evidence-based strategies that appreciated
the value of scientific evidence. This research
clearly shows the value of shining a light on the
difference between rhetoric and reality in M&E.
Creating comparator data: We argue that to deal
with the information asymmetries in M&E
provision, there is significant value in collecting
comparator data on both M&E suppliers and
users. There are many mechanisms that rate
non-profit organisations and charities
(http://greatnonprofits.org/ and
www.charitynavigator.org/). There are
mechanisms that evaluate private foundations
(Center for Effective Philanthropy’s Grantee
Perception Reports) and international networks,
social investors and international development
NGOs (Keystone Accountability’s Performance
Surveys). There are indices that rate the
effectiveness of aid agencies (Center for Global
Development’s Commitment to Development
Index). There are also programmes that rate
think tanks (www.sas.upenn.edu/irp/). We cannot
find any mechanism that rates M&E providers.
Nor can we find any site or programme that
rates the capacity to use M&E information for
improved performance. Both the African
Evaluation Association and the American
Evaluation Association have publicly searchable
databases of evaluators, with neither
organisation endorsing the list in terms of
quality of provider or performance assessment by
third parties. Could this be done through a
reputation market?32 As Jackson (2009) reports,
Dellarocus (2002) suggests that online
reputation markets are most likely to succeed
where traditional trust building mechanisms
(e.g. state-enforced contractual guarantees) fail.
The characteristics of these successful online
reputation markets include: lack of repeated
interaction (e.g. one-off trades are most
common), large numbers of small players,
geographically dispersed actors, and
relationships built on easily changeable
pseudonyms. Jackson notes that these features
(with the exception of geographic dispersion) do
not seem to characterise the marketplace for
agricultural M&E. Instead he suggests effort
should be made to develop criteria for verifying
the quality of the information provided by M&E
organisations/practitioners to existing databases. 
6 Conclusions 
The context for M&E is changing. Impact and
value for money are the mantra du jour in the age of
austerity. But M&E as we currently know it is
threadbare. It does not attract enough
investment. It is viewed as an enabler of
compliance rather than of competence. When it is
done well, it is done to satisfy donors, not the
intended beneficiaries. Agriculture does not
escape this conclusion, and it may even
exacerbate it. M&E in agriculture is woeful. Why
is it so weak? We argue that investment and
interest is low because the multiple benefits of
good M&E are not identified and when they are,
they cannot be captured. The fact that so much
M&E goes on undercover allows this situation to
persist. 
What can be done? We suggest a new type of
M&E is needed, one that is people-centred and
which focuses on wellbeing outcomes, and asks
people about what they need and what they think
is working. There are three components of this
approach. First, it balances multiple
accountabilities through greater participation in
programme design, implementation and
evaluation. The literature on the impacts of
these approaches has grown in the past ten years
and shows more successes than failures. Second,
it focuses on enhancing organisational incentives
for learning. What needs to change for
organisations to engage in single- and double-
loop learning? Beneficiary feedback systems
represent one such incentive, and new donor
requirements would provide another. The third
feature of this people-centred M&E is that it
seeks to build wider learning about M&E, its
users and its providers. The semi-closed nature
of M&E is inhibiting the sharing of learning
about what works and who does it well. 
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We believe that M&E in agriculture has to be
improved and this article has presented some
hypotheses for how it can be. The evidence is
stronger for some of the hypotheses than others.
We hope the article opens up a debate about the
best ways to strengthen M&E in agriculture. If
M&E in agriculture is not improved then we will
have wasted the political opportunity
represented by the current high interest in food
and agriculture. We will have no excuses when
the budget axe is eventually aimed at food and
agriculture, and we will have failed to meet our
obligations to the current and future generations
of hungry and malnourished people.
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Notes
1 We thank Chris Barnett for his insightful
comments. Any errors are ours. 
2 The full speech can be accessed at
www.gatesfoundation.org/speeches-
commentary/Pages/bill-gates-2009-world-food-
prize-speech.aspx (accessed 16 August 2010).
3 We could not find any studies that estimated
the value added of strong versus weak M&E.
This is not surprising – one would need good
M&E to assess the extent of foregone benefits
from weak M&E. For such an estimate to be
credible each project would have to have two
randomly allocated M&E systems in place – a
good one that assessed the inputs, outputs and
outcomes of the project in a reliable way and
one that did not. We could not find an
experiment like this and in any case it is
ethically questionable. 
4 This is why we resist the temptation to delink
monitoring and evaluation. As two sides of the
same coin they both contribute to the
multiple purposes of M&E. 
5 The suggested corrective measures in this
article emerge mainly from a partnership
between IDS and Keystone Accountability to
strengthen M&E in agriculture development.
Keystone has been a pioneering advocate for
systems of M&E that are grounded in dialogic
learning for improvement between
development agencies and their intended
beneficiaries.
6 After a decline over the past 30 years, over the
period 2003–08, bilateral aid to agriculture
increased at an average annual rate of 13 per
cent (real terms) according to the OECD. See
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/38/44116307.pdf
(accessed 16 August 2010). A rapid
assessment by FAO in 2009 of financing to
agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)
(based on data from the OECD, major
bilateral and multilateral financing agencies,
as well as two private foundations active in the
agriculture sector), concluded that Official
Development Assistance (ODA) to the
agriculture sector has increased and there is
more financing for agriculture in SSA than
usually assumed if aid flows from private
foundations are included. There are also a
number of new commitments for agriculture
that have been made by various important
donors (World Bank, EU, AfDB, IsDB and
IFAD). See www.fao.org/docrep/012/al144e/
al144e.pdf (accessed 16 August 2010).
7 Note that statistical analysis of the
stakeholder data did not show any significant
associations between answers and participant
characteristics. 
8 www.povertyactionlab.org (accessed 16 August
2010).
9 www.3ieimpact.org/page.php?pg=round1
(accessed 16 August 2010).
10 This is a self-selected perception survey and so
will be subject to bias. We invited people to
take part in the following way: ‘We are writing
to ask for your input to help shape the design
of a new initiative to improve M&E practices
in agriculture.’ It may be the case that those
who were more likely to respond to the survey
felt that M&E in agriculture is weak, although
there is no ex ante reason to expect that the
relative weights given to any one cause of its
weakness would be biased. A multiple
regression analysis of these data showed that
NGOs as a group tended to rate M&E in
agriculture more strongly than other groups.
11 This is similar to other frameworks, such as
the purposes identified by the European
Commission (2007) (see Lucas and
Longhurst, this IDS Bulletin) and Mackay
(2007).
12 Woolcock’s review (2009) suggests that this
dimension of project performance – impact
trajectories – is chronically underfunded.
Different types of projects will have different
types of trajectories. The impacts of conditional
cash transfers may be quite proportional to the
resources poured into them. But the same may
not be the case for projects with a long
gestation (e.g. science and technology
interventions) or projects that rely on a certain
intensity of participation (e.g. market access
projects or technology adoption) or projects
where adaptation to the intervention can occur
(e.g. pest control). Randomisation per se does
not help here because the impact estimated
will depend on when the follow-up surveys are
conducted. What is needed is an explicit time
dimension to the theory of change and the use
of monitoring data to track impact trajectories,
especially when there is significant behaviour
change involved. 
13 He notes that randomisation for impact
assessment will not per se help with the context
issue because those selected to receive a
‘treatment’ (i.e. participate in the programme)
will not be the same as those who seek to
participate in a programme in practice. 
14 For example: a systematic review of the
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
estimated that 15 per cent of all its reports
included impact assessments, but noted that
‘[m]any evaluations were unable to properly
assess impact because of methodological
shortcomings’ (Victora 1995). Similarly, a
review of 127 studies of 258 community health
financing programmes found that only two
studies were able to derive robust conclusions
about the impact on access to health services
(ILO 2002).
15 Their discussion is primarily focused on the
incentives for organisational learning and thus
primarily concerned with implementing
organisations, but these mirror the overall
misalignment of incentives in the aid system
(Barder 2009).
16 The dilemma of the role of implementing
agencies in this situation is the argument
behind the concept of the alien-hand syndrome
(Power et al. 2002). They argue that the success
of the implementing agencies is dependent on
satisfying the donor, not the community it
serves. This disconnect results in ‘success’ – i.e.
empowering communities and giving them
voice – possibly being detrimental to the
success of the implementing agency because it
creates a direct accountability link which may
threaten the organisation’s methods, mission or
focus if a community has the ability to question
the organisation’s choices or approaches. Power
compares non-profits to the private sector
where there is an incentive to engage in
organisational learning that values the
knowledge and experiences of the customer, as
this will help determine success. The dilemma
is unique to the aid system – in countries whose
public services are financed by taxation, those
who deliver public services are accountable to
politicians, who in turn are accountable to tax
payers – the same people who are meant to
benefit from public services (Barder 2009). 
17 Complex is here distinguished from
complicated. For a more detailed discussion,
see Rogers (2008).
18 Lucas and Longhurst in this IDS Bulletin
agree that this is certainly the case in
comparison to health where there is a wide
variety of well-understood basic health
interventions that are generally regarded as
both effective and inexpensive.
19 del Carpio (2009) notes how difficult it is to
undertake impact evaluations in agriculture
and how hard the evaluators have had to work
to construct a plausible comparator group,
often through the innovative use of non-M&E
data. 
20 In many ways this argument is more
instrumental than the participatory M&E
advocates would be comfortable with.
Beneficiaries have access to knowledge,
expertise and relationships that other actors
do not. But these views may not be the most
accurate in the system, nor the most cost-
effective to access, nor any less politically
motivated or subject to capture than other
actors in the system (see for instance
Parkinson 2009). As such our approach can be
seen as a combination of a rights and a
results-based approach. See Jacobs et al. in this
IDS Bulletin for a detailed discussion.
21 The study provides strong statistical evidence
that increasing beneficiary participation leads
directly to better project performance – a 10
per cent increase in participation of the rural
poor in these projects resulted in a 2 per cent
increase in overall performance.
22 The Khwaja study is methodologically the
most rigorous, comparing a random selection
of community-driven projects with similar but
non-community-driven projects in the same
village. This concludes that community
participation significantly improves outcomes
when the community is involved in non-
technical decisions, but worsens them when
the community is involved in technical
decisions that require expert knowledge.
23 An update note by the same authors a few
years later (Mansuri and Rao 2006) is
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noteworthy because there are so few
additional studies on the impact of
participation on project outcomes (there are a
few more on the distribution of benefits which
give similar results to the initial paper). 
24 This study is suspect because of the way in
which they report the same Hoddinott et al.
paper (2001). Platteau states ‘Hoddinott et al.
(2001) (who) studied the effects of
participation in public work programs in the
Western Cape Province in South Africa. Their
results indicate that participation has no
effect whatsoever on any of the (employment)
outcome variables that they have considered.’ 
25 Gaventa and Barrett (2010) note that 25 per
cent of the outcomes in the sample of case
studies were negative.
26 See www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/
peer-effects-pupil-teacher-ratios-and-teacher-
incentives-kenya (accessed 16 August 2010).
27 This review is based on an earlier version of
Oswald and Taylor in this IDS Bulletin.
28 See Jacobs et al. in this IDS Bulletin for a
further discussion on the drivers of adopting
participatory M&E.
29 As Bonbright and Power note in their article
in this IDS Bulletin, the business sector has
long established the correlation between
customer satisfaction (the business analogue
to beneficiary participation in M&E) and
performance improvements, profits and
shareholder value. Businesses invest billions
of dollars in eliciting customer feedback
annually.
30 See http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/
EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22547256
~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSiteP
K:4607,00.html (accessed 16 August 2010).
31 See www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/6/09-
074393/en/index.html (accessed 16 August
2010).
32 Online reputation markets trade access to
reviews of goods and services that rank and
comment on quality. 
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